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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------WESTERN LAND EQUITIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation; LeGRANDE
REEDER and LEAH DAWN REEDER,

)
)
)
)

Respondents,

)
)

vs.

)
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL; MAYOR
DESHOND L. ANDERSON; DARWIN
H. LARSEN; CAROL W. CLAY;
LOYE E. YillRTINDALE; CLAUDE
J. BURTENSHAH, and GLENN
T. BAIRD,

)
)
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)
)
)
)
)
)

Appellants.

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs sought and obtained a judgment against Defendants wherein the court determined that the defendants
were estopped from withholding approval of plaintiffs' proposed residential subdivision plan and found, as a matter of
law, that plaintiffs had a vested right to proceed with
their proposed residential subdivision.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The parties filed a Statement of Stipulated Facts and a
Statement of Stipulated Issues with the district court.
Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment requesting
the district court to declare that plaintiffs had a vested
right to develop a subdivision consisting of single-family
dwelling units and to further declare that defendants were
estopped from prohibiting plaintiffs' development of their
property.
The district court ordered plaintiffs' subdivision to
be approved on the grounds that the defendants were estopped
from refusing to approve the subdivision and that plaintiffs
had a vested right to develop the subdivision subject only
to plaintiffs' cowpliance with the reasonable requirements
of the Logan City Ordinances.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-respondents seek to affirm the lower court's
order which estopped defendants from disapproving plaintiffs'
proposed residential subdivision and granted plaintiffs a
vested right to develop the proposed residential subdivision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February, 1969, plaintiffs purchased 18.53 acres of
land located within the boundaries of the City of Logan
between Third and Sixth North and Sixth and Eighth West with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the intent to develop the property for uses including the
development of single-family dwelling units for families
seeking residential housing in a moderate price range.

In

connection with the purchase and development of said property,
the plaintiffs expended

s~bstantial

time and effort in

conducting marketing studies in order to determine the
highest, and best use for the property.

The plaintiffs

determined that there was a need for moderate-priced housing
in the City of Logan and that this would be the highest and
best use in connection with the development of the property.
Lev~ande

Reeder, one of the plaintiffs, and principal

owner and President of plaintiff, Western Land Equities,
Inc., had several conversations with members of the Logan
City Municipal Council and the City Planner, Mark Brenchley,
regarding the development of the property.

Reeder informed

those officials of his intent to develop the property for
single-family dwelling residential uses and was encouraged
by the City Planner and members of the Municipal Council to
develop the property for such a use.
Prior to April, 1976, the area in which plaintiffs were
to develop their property permitted the development of
single-fan,ily dwelling homes.

In April, 1976, the City of

Logan adopted a land-use ordinance (Logan City Ordinances,
§17-l-l, et

~)

under which the plaintiffs' above-described

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property was designated in an M-1 zone, known as a light industry district.

Among the permitted uses of property

within the M-1 district, until January 31, 1978, was "dwelling,
one family detached" which term is used by the City of Logan
to designate subdivisions consisting of single-family residential
units.
The City of Logan has also adopted an ordinance entitled
Subdivision Rules and Recommendations, Logan City Ordinances,
§17-22-1, et

~·

which sets forth the procedures whereby

single-family residential subdivisions are to be approved by
the City of Logan.

That procedure is as follows:

1.

Consultation with the Logan City
Planning Commission;

2.

Preparation and submittal of three
copies of a preliminary plan of the
subdivision with the Logan City Planning Commission.
The Plan is to comply
with the minimum requirements set forth
in the subdivision ordinance;

3.

The applicant is to obtain the Logan
City Planning Commission's approval of
a preliminary plan.
If the preliminary
plan is disapproved, reasons for disapproval shall be transmitted to the
applicant.

4.

If the Planning Commission approves the
preliminary plan, the applicant is to
prepare final plans and specifications
including the minimum improvements
required by Section 17-22-7 and submit
the plans and specifications to the Logan
City Planning Commission for final approval.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5.

The final plan is either approved or disapproved by the Logan City Planning Commission.

Pursuant to the 1976 Ordinance requirements, in March,
1977, plaintiffs undertook to comply with the Logan City
Subdivision Ordinance and to do whatever was necessary for
the development of single-family dwelling units upon the
property in question.

During that same month, plaintiffs

consulted with Hike Lund of Hountain Hest Design and contracted with him to prepare a preliminary subdivision plan
and present the plan to the Logan City Planning Commission
and the Logan City Hunicipal Council for their approval.
Thereafter, plaintiff, LeGrande Reeder, and his engineer,
Hike Lund, consulted with the Logan City Engineering and
Planning Department regarding the proposed subdivision and
informed the officials of each department of plaintiffs'
intention to develop the property in question. After these
consultations, plaintiffs directed their engineer to prepare
a preliminary plan consisting of an 89-lot subdivision to be
known as the Hillow Creek Subdivision. This plan was prepared
by plaintiffs' engineer, Hike Lund, and submitted to the
Logan City Planning

Co~~ission

on July 18, 1977.

The pre-

liminary plan was unanimously accepted and placed on the
agenda for a second reading before the Planning Commission.

On August 10, 1977, Hike Lund appeared before the Logan
City Planning Commission for the second reading and approval
of the Willow Creek Subdivision Preliminary Plan.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Consideration of the Preliminary Plan was tabled and plaintiffs
were asked to approach the Logan City Municipal Council to
consider the question of whether residential housing should
be permitted in a district designated "M-1."
On August 18, 1977, plaintiffs' engineer presented the

Willow Creek Subdivision Preliminary Plan to the Logan City
Municipal Council for approval.

The Council referred the

matter back to the Logan City Planning Commission with the
recommendation that protective covenants be written and that
more roadways into and out of the subdivision be investigated.
Plaintiffs' engineer again appeared before the Logan City
Planning Commission on September 14, 1977, at which time
the Commission tabled the matter for a period of 60 days.
On October 12, 1977. the Logan City Planning Commission,
again met and at this meeting, the Planning Commission,
for the first time, went on record as opposing subdivisions
in "M-1" zones.
On November 9, 1977, the Logan City Planning Commission

rejected plaintiffs' proposed Hillow Creek Subdivision,
stating the following grounds:
1.

The Hillow Creek Subdivision was against the
the "intent" of the Logan City Land Use
Ordinance and the master plan; and

2.

The Willow Creek Subdivision Plan provided
for only one ingress and egress, and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3.

The Willow Cr2ek Subdivision Plan was surrounded by railroads on three sides.

The foregoing are the only reasons which the Logan City
Planning Commission cited to plaintiffs in connection wi.th
their rejection of plaintiffs' subdivision.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the Logan City
Planning

Con~ission

to the Logan City Municipal Council.

Plaintiffs' appeal was rejected at a meeting of the council
on November 17, 1977.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the First Judicial
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah, on December
23, 1977.

Thereafter, on January 31, 1978, Logan City

amended its land-use ordinance so as to specifically restrict the development of single-family dwelling units in an
"M-1" district except by special permit.

The parties submitted

a stipulated statement of facts and a stipulated statement
of issues to the court in connection with plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment requesting the court to determine, as a
matter of law, that plaintiffs had a vested right to develop
their subdivision consisting of single-family dwelling homes
and that defendants, as a matter of law, were estopped from
denying

app~oval

of plaintiffs' subdivision. The stipulated

statement of issues submitted to the court are set forth
below as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Counsel for the parties submit the
following stipulated issues of law
for the court's determination:
1.
Did the M-1 land-use description
as set forth in the Logan City LandUse Ordinance of 1976, prior to the
January 31, 1978 amendment, permit
the development of subdivisions consisting of single-family dwelling units
on property zoned M-l?
2.
Does the amendment to the M-1
land-use description of the Logan City
Land-Use Ordinance of 1976, which was
adopted January 31, 1978 and which prohibits the development of single-family
units in the M-1 zone except by special
use permit, give defendants the authority
to deny approval of plaintiffs' Willow
Creek Subdivision which was submitted prior
to the amendment and appears to be proper
in all other respects other than those
items set forth in paragraph 9 of the
stipulated statement of facts?
Paragraph 9 of the stipulated statement of facts submitted to the court is set forth as follows:
~t has not been contended by defendants
that this preliminary plan did not comply
in all articulars v1ith the minimum requ~rements o
t e Logan City Su division
Ordinance with the exception that Logan
City has raised questions concerning ingress and egress in and out of the subdivision, the fact that the subdivision
is surrounded on three sides by railroad
tracks and the need to establish protective covenants restraining manufacturing
uses within the subdivision.
It is not
intended by the parties that the provisions
herein shall be binding upon them with
respect to the subdivision's compliance
with minimum requirements.
(Emphasis
added).
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Both of the Stipulated Issues of Law submitted by
the parties to the district court for its determination
involve the doctrines of vested rights and equitable estoppel.

The appellants have raised other issues in their

brief relating to alleged technical items of non··compliance
with the zoning ordinance by the plaintiffs, such as the
lack of a vlalbvay.

However, the clistri ct: court found, as

a matter of fact, that the plaintiffs had complied with or
indicated that they would comply with each reasonable requirement established by the defendants.
found,

as a matter of fact,

The court also

that the City Planner and

municipal co1..mcil members encouraged the development.

As

clearly evidenced by the defendants' action in going on
record opposing subdivisions in the M-1 zone and in so
amending the ordinance, the only real objection to plaintiffs' proposed subdivision was that the defendants decided
that they did not want a residential subdivision in the M-1
zone, even though the use was permitted under the zoning
ordinance.

This was the issue first submitted to the

court below by stipulation of the parties.

The second

issue goes to whether a local zoning authority may, with
retroactive application, amend or change its zoning laws.
These are the only issues which were before the court below, and the appellants cannot at this time raise other
issues.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court granted plaintiffs' :t-1otion for Su!TU11ary Judgment
and in so doing, entered the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The M-1 land-use description as set
forth in the Logan City Land-Use
Ordinance of 1976 did permit the
development of subdivisions consisting of detached single-family dwelling
units on properties zoned M-1 prior to
January 31, 1978.

2.

Plaintiffs have substantially complied
with the procedural requirements of the
Logan City Ordinance, §17-22-1, with respect to seeking approval of their preliminary subdivision plan prior to filing
this action.

3.

Plaintiffs have a vested right to develop
a subdivision consisting of detached
single-family dwelling units upon the subject property in accordance with the reasonable requirements set forth in the Logan
City ordinances.

4.

Defendants are estopped from denying
plaintiffs' preliminary subdivision on the
grounds that it is situated in an M-1 use zone.

Pursuant to the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs and against
the defendants granting plaintiffs the right to develop the subdivision consisting of detached single-family dwelling homes
and directed that the plaintiffs develop their subdivision in a
manner consistent with the reasonable requirements of the Logan
City ordinances relating to subdivision development.
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ARGUMENT ONE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VESTED RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT
THE WILLOW CREEK SUBDIVISION
It is a stipulated fact that the area wherein plaintiffs'
proposed subdivision is located is zoned M-1 under Logan
City Zoning Ordinances.

It has also been stipulated that at

the time plaintiffs made application for approval of their
subdivision, one of the permitted uses in the M-1 district
was, "Dwelling, one-family DET."

The parties stipulated the

term "Dwelling, one-family DET, ·· is the term by which the
City of Logan Zoning Ordinance provides for single-family
residential use within specified use districts.

The district

court further found that the term "dwelling, one-family
detached,·· was the term which was used by the city of Logan
to designate subdivisions consisting of single-family residential
units.

This finding by the court is consistent with the use

with which the term is used throughout the 1976 Logan City
Ordinance.

There can be no question but what, as the district

court found, single-family detached dwellings and subdivisions
consisting of single-family residential units were permitted
in the M-1 zone prior to the change in the zoning ordinance
on January 3, 1978, which change was made several months
after plaintiffs' request for approval of the Willow Creek
Subdivision and after plaintiffs filed their action for
declaratory and equitable relief.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Utah Supreme Court has already decided the question
whether a municipality can change its zoning ordinance to
prohibit a proposed use for which application has been made
prior to the change.

In Contracts Funding

& Mortgage

Exchange v. Maynes, 527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974), the plaintiff
had sought a conditional use permit for the construction of
mobile homes.

The Salt Lake County Planning Commission

conditionally approved the application and afterward verbally
denied plaintiff's application for a building permit.

There-

after, a written notice of such denial was given and the
plaintiff appealed directly to the county commission.

The

county commission denied the request and later, when the
plaintiff again sought a building permit, the commission not
only denied the appeal, but, two days later, passed a zoning
ordinance which would not allow plaintiff's proposed use.
The court stated:
Therefore, as we see it, the plaintiff
had a right to build what it said it
wanted to build, if it had filed an
application for a permit to do so.
527 P.2d at 1074 (Emphasis is the
court's).
The Utah Supreme Court held that the county could not
eliminate the plaintiffs' right to develop property in a
manner consistent with the use available at the time that
plaintiff submitted its application to the county.

The

court further held that the county could not eliminate a
permissible use under such circumstances by enacting an ex
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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post facto zoning change.

The court stated:

There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the County or anyone else, denied the
application for a permit because of failure
to file something, pay something, do something or violate something.
The presumption
in this case is in favor of the applicant's
right, with incidental, but serious constitutional and other problems proposed by the
facts here as to due process, impairment of
the obligation of contracts, scope of sovereign
authority, etc.
There is considerable urgence in this,
some of "'hich appears to be gratuitous
. suggesting an omnipotence in County
government to disturb or destroy pre-existing
property rights, which seems to be the nub
of the case.
We think the only way the County could
have justified a reversal of the trial
court's decision, would have been to show
that "Contracts," after having been denied
the opportunity (which v:as not granted
here), had not satisfied some kind of
procedural, governmental or other regulation as a condition precedent to the
application's grant, -which the County
here completely has failed in its task
to establish.
The simple fact is, that a property
owner, having done everything necessary
under existing laws, cannot be expected
to be circumscribed by ex post facto
modus operandi leges, such as zoning
Ordinances presuming to upside-down
the hourglass.
. ..
The weakness of defendant's case is
anorcfinance .~:L~iT sus-tal:necra:5 to the
property--;uDJect of -Enl:STitlgatlon,
wourcr-uestroy property rlgr.ts ancrcmiisculatc an-oeT:LrDTi-13--u:-Iavls and
ref0::iT<iflo!13 extanCattEctirne applicatlon J or J. pennl t lv3S made,
Dy retroS?CCL~-.:-ancfeTicctlve by such ex
post
facto clet(•rmination, as of a date nearly a
before.
IfFunding
this
be permissible
isLibrary Services
Sponsored year
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
provided by the Institute there
of Museum and
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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no reason why the ordinance could
not reach back five years, a decade or
earlier. 527 P. 2d at 1074. (Emphasis added).
The plaintiffs purchased the property and intended to
develop the property for uses including the development of
single-family dwelling units. Plaintiff, LeGrande Reeder,
had several conversations with the City Planner and members
of the Logan City Municipal Council in which he informed
them of his intent to so develop the property and was encouragec
by them to proceed with that development.

The district court

found that plaintiffs undertook to comply with the Logan City
Subdivision Ordinance and made an effort to do whatever was
necessary for the development of single-family dwelling
units upon their property.

(Finding No. 9)

Plaintiffs prepared a preliminary subdivision plan and
presented it to the Logan City Planning Commission on July
18, 1977, where the plan was unanimously accepted. (Finding
No. 12).
On August 10, 1977, plaintiffs' engineer appeared before
the Logan City Planning Commission for a second reading concern·
ing the approval of the subdivision and the planning commission
voted to table the matter until the municipal council could
consider the question whether residential housing would be
permitted in a district designated as "M-1." (Finding No. 13).
On August 18, 1978, plaintiffs presented the preliminary
plan to the Logan City Municipal Council for approval and
the city commission referred the matter back to the planning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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commission Hith recommendations for protective covenants and
more roadways concerning ingress and egress through the
subdivision.

(Finding No. 14) .

On September 14, 1977 plaintiffs again appeared before
the Logan City Planning Connnission but the commission tabled
a decision to approve or disapprove of the subdivision for a
matter of 60 days.

(Finding No. 15).

On October 12, 1977, the Logan City Planning Connnission
again met and decided to go on record as opposing the development
of subdivisions in areas designated "M-1."
On November 9, 1977, the Logan City Planning Connnission rejected plaintiffs' proposed subdivision and plaintiffs appealed
the decision of the Logan City Planning Commission to the Logan
City Municipal Council.

Plaintiffs' appeal was rejected at a meet-

ing of the Logan City Municipal Council held on November 17, 1977.
(Findings 17 and 18).
On the 31st day of January, 1978, after plaintiffs had
commenced an action in the district court seeking declaratory
relief that plaintiffs had a vested right to develop their subdivision as proposed and that defendants were estopped from denying
the development of the plaintiffs' subdivision as proposed, the
Logan City Municipal Council amended the Logan City Land Use
Ordinances to restrict single-family dwelling units located in
"M-1" districts except by special use permit only.

(Finding No.l9).

The court further found that the Logan City Planning
Commission refused to approve plaintiffs' subdivision plan
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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although the plaintiffs

had complied and had indicated that

they would comply with all reasonable requirements established
by the local governing authorities with respect to the
application for and development of their subdivision (Finding
No. 21).
Nowhere did Logan City allege or attempt to prove that
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy some procedure, or
regulation which was a condition precedent to granting approval
as required by Contracts Funding.

The simple fact is that plain-

tiffs in the instant case did not fail to file something,
pay something, do something or violate something.

Under

Contracts Funding, where, as here, a property owner such as
the plaintiffs have done everything necessary under existing
laws (1976 Logan City Ordinance), they "cannot be expected
to be circumscribed by ex post facto modus operandi leges,
such zoning ordinances presuming to be upside-down the
hourglass."
Based upon the foregoing circumstances and findings the
court concluded, as a matter of law, that "plaintiffs have a
vested right to develop a subdivision consisting of detached
single-family dwelling units upon the subject property."
Plaintiffs urge the court to affirm the rule established
in Contracts Funding that once proper application has been made
for a use permitted under then-existing zoning ordinances, the
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rights of the applicant vest and the zoning authority cannot then change or prevent the use allowed at the time
application was made.

Such a principle of law is not only

just, but is also demanded for sound, public policy reasons.
If municipal councils and the various local governments
throughout the state of Utah are allowed to amend their
ordinances with retroactive application, such a precedent
would serve to discourage development, and further discourage the financial backing v1hich is necessary for such
development.

If local governmental entities were able to

so change the zoning laT.vs, lending i.:1stitutions would
certainly be more hesitant to commit substantial funds to
building projects and their developers.

Doubtless,

these same institutions would require higher interest
rates and higher security for any loans they might make
for such developments.

Such is not the law and plaintiffs-

respondents urge the court to, at this time, affirm those
principles laid down in Contracts Funding, supra.
ARGUMENT TWO
DEFENDANTS ARE EOUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING APPROVAL 'oF PLAINTIFFS' SUBDIVISION PLAN
In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 692 (Utah
1976) the Supreme Court articulated the requirements of
equitable estoppel:
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Estoppel arises when a party .
. by h:i s
acts, representations, or admissions, or by
his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable negligence,
induces another . . to believe certain facts
to exist and that such other .
. acting
with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that he will suffer
an injustic8 if the former . . is permitted
to deny the existence of such facts.
549 P.2d
at 697.
The Court further noted that the "doctrine of equitable
estoppel does not operate in favor of one who has knowledge
of the eseential facts or who has convenient and available
means of obtaining such knowledge", 549 P.2d at 697

4, nor is

it applicable if the party seeking the protection of equity
"exercised neither prudence nor diligence."
In Dansie v.

~h~::-ca.··

C:.t:y, 560 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1977),

the court recognizee that the doctrine of estoppel applied
to zoning situations.

However, the court held that estoppel

was inapplicable under the fact situation of that case.

One

of the reasons given in Dansie that the estoppel doctrine
did not apply was that the city employee who gave out information
which led the petitioner to believe that he could erect a
structure in violation of the zoning laws had "no authority
whatever" to give out that information.
In Morgan, the court laid out the applicable test for
the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Under Morgan, there are four essential elements which must
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he found before the doctrine will apply.

These are:

(1)

A~ts,

(2)

~ntcntionally or through culpable negligence
lnduce another to believe certain facts
to exist;

(3)

The parties so induced to believe must
with reasonable prudence and diligence
rely upon an ace thereon such that

(4)

They will suffer an injustice if the
person who made the representations
is permitted to deny the existence of
such f:J.cts.

representations or omissions, or
Sllence when one ought to speak which,

In the instant case, there were several acts and representations, as well as omissions, made by defendants to
plaintiffs v:hich would have led a reasonable person to
believe that the approval of plaintiffs' subdivision would
be given.
The court below found that plaintiff, LeGrande Reeder,
had several conversations with members of the Logan City
Municipal Council and the City Planner informing them of
his intention to develop a subdivision consisting of singlefamily dwelling homes.

Plaintiff Reeder was encouraged by

those officials to develop the property for such purpose.
Plaintiff Reeder, from the date of his purchase of the
property in February of 1969 until August of 1977, was never
informed hy any city official that a subdivision consisting
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of single-family dwelling units situated upon the subject
property would be prohibited so long as plaintiffs complied
with the reasonable requirements of the Logan City Ordinances.
(Findings 7 and 8). The plaintiffs did what was necessary to
apply for and develop the subdivision in a manner consistent
with the Logan City Subdivision Ordinances (Findings No. 9
and 21).
The actions of the Logan City officials constituted
acts, representations, admissions, and silence when they
should have spoken, all of which would have led a reasonable
person to believe that approval of the subdivision would
be given upon compliance v7ith the requirements of the subdivision
ordinance.
The defendants' statements and actions of encouragement
to plaintiffs referred to above and found to exist by the
court were either made intentionally through a belief that
such a subdivision did not violate the ordinance, or, the Logan
City officials misled or were "culpably negligent" in not having
understood the ordinance which they enacted and administered.
The plaintiffs' reliance upon their statements, as the only
authorized people to give such statements, certainly was
reasonable and prudent.
Having received such encouragement from the Logan City
officials, the plaintiffs, in t1arch of 1977, undertook to
comply with the Logan City Subdivision Ordinance and made an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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effort to do whatever was necessary for the deveopment of
sjngle-family dwelling units upon the property. The plaintiffs
consulted with Mountain West Design and in particular, Mike
Luncl, who prepared the preliminary subdivision plat and
presented the plat ro the Logan City Planning Commission and
the Logan City !1unicipal Council for their approval.

Not

only were there expenses involved in this as well as surveys
made for the property, but the fact that the property was
not utilized for some other purpose during this period of
time because of the representations made by the Logan City
officials and relied upon by the plaintiffs creates a large
amount of damage suffered by plaintiffs.

Because of the

city's actions, and the litigation which has followed, for
two years now, approval has been sought for the Willow Creek
Subdivision Preliminary Plan.

Certain out-of-pocket expenses

incurred by the plaintiffs are detailed in the defendants'
brief.

However, the plaintiffs have also lost time, payments

on the property, tax monies paid, and other items of expense
which necessarily accrue to the owner of vacant property.
The cumulative effect of these circumstances is that the
plaintiffs •<Jill suffer a great injustice if the city is
permitted to deny that plaintiffs' Willow Creek Subdivision
Preliminary Plan conforms with the Logan City Subdivision
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and Zoning Ordinances. There was never any allegation by defendants or finding by the district court that plaintiffs
had any convenient or available means for obtaining the
knowledge that their subdivision would not or could not be
allowed under the subdivision ordinance. By its terms, the
ordinance allowed for single-family dwelling units and this same
term was used by the city to designate those areas in which
single-family residential subdivisions would be allowed.
This difficulty is further compounded in the face of the
defendants' silence as to any problems and the defendants' encouraging statements which were made by the City Planner and
members of the Municipal Council regarding the plaintiffs'
subdivision plans<
gineer conversed

o~

~i:h

at least three occasions, pl&intiffs' en:~e

City Planner concerning the subdivision

requirements for the preliminary plat which was being prepared
by plaintiffs' engineer, and no mention was made or indication
given that the Planning Commission would refuse to allow a
subdivision of single-family dwelling units to be constructed
upon the plaintiffs' property.
These actions by the Logan City officials constituted
actions, statements, and silence when actions and statements
should have been made, which were either intentionally or
negligently made and which reasonably induced the plaintiffs
to rely in fact upon such representations. The situation is
such that the plaintiffs will suffer a great injustice as
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evidenced by the great expense of time and money caused
by defendants' actions if defendants are permitted to
deny approval of the subdivision.
ARGL'11ENT THREE
DEFENDANTS H.<WE MISREPRESENTED THE
CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAH REGARDING
VESTED RIGHTS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
On Page 22 of appellants' brief, appellants cite
Dawe v. City of Scarsdale, 119 Ariz. 486, 581 P.2d 1136
(1978) as "a typical example of the proper application of
the universally accepted principles of vested rights and
non-conforming uses." (Emphasis added).

Respondents submit

that there is great controversy, and no ''universally-accepted"
methodology for handling vested rights and equitable estoppel
issues.
Some states, such as California, place the time of
vesting after the builder has applied for and received a
building permit for the specific buildings and performed
substantial work in reliance thereof.

See, Avco v.

Southcoast Regional Commission, 535 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976).
It would seem that the Arizona court cited by appellants
appears to follow the California standard.
Other slates, such as Idaho and South Carolina allow
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rights to vest at the time of application for a permit.

See

Ready to Pour, Inc. v. McCoy, 95 Idaho 510, 511 P.2d 792 (1973);
Pure Oil Division v. City of Columbia, 173 S.E.2d, 145 (S.C. 1970)
The South Carolina court stated:
We see no sound reason to protect vested
rights acquired after a permit is issued,
and to deny such protection to similar
rights acquired under an ordinance as it
existed at the time a proper application
for a permit is made.
In both instances,
the right protected is the same, that is,
the good faith reliance by the owner of the
right to use his property as permitted under
the Zoning Ordinance in force at the time of
the application for a permit.
173 S.E.2d at
143.
The court went on to state that the issuance of the required
permit
no~ ~e legally denied,
sequentiy-c~acted ordinance

could

even under a subprohibiting such
use, su as to deprive the owner of the
vested rights acquired.
[V]ested rights acquired under a zoning
ordinance in effect at the time of the
application for a permit will be protected
even against a change in the zoning ordinance,
and controls our decision here on that issue.
Id.
Other states, such as v]ashington, place the time of vesting at either the time the permit is applied for, or sought
and validly issued.

There is some controversy on this point

in the Washington appellate courts at this time.

See Nayer~

v. Town of Steilacoom, 17 Hash. App. 558, 564 P.2d 1170 (\<lash.
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App. 1977); Ulloch v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wash.App. 573,
565 P.2d 1179 (Wash. App. 1977).
Oregon, on the other hand, does not follow any of the
general rules stated above.

In Clackamas Co. v.

Holm~_£,

265

Ore. 193, J08 P.2d 190 (1973), the Oregon Supreme Court
stated that the determination of the time of vesting was to
be made factually on a case-by-case basis.

In order to

acquire a vested right to proceed with construction of a
non-conforming use after a zone change, substantial construction
must have been started, or substantial costs incurred.

The

court should also consider the ratio of expenditures to
total cost of the project, good faith of the landowner,
whether the owner had notice of any proposed zoning changes
before starting his improvements, the kind of project, the
location and ultimate cost of the project, and whether the
expenditures could be used for any allowed use. The court
rejected any set formula for determining the time when
rights vest and particularly rejected the theory that rights
vest only after receiving a building permit.
Hawaii has recently held the opposite of the California
theory of vested rights urged upon the court by the defendants.

In Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 571

P.2d 328 (llawaii 1977) the Hawaii Supreme Court, quoting
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from Heeter, "Zoning Estoppel; Application of the Principles
of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes"
71 Urban L. Ann.

63 at 64 through 65 stated:

The defense of estoppel is derived from
equity, but the defense of vested rights
reflects principles of common and constitutional law.
Similarly their elements are
different.
Estoppel focuses on whether
it would be inequitable to allow the
government to repudiate its prior
conduct; vested rights upon whether the
owner acquired real property rights
which cannot be taken away by governmental
regulation.
Nevertheless, the courts
seem to reach the same results when apply
ing these defenses to identical factual
situations.
571 P.2d at 329.
The Allen court recognized the position urged upon this
court at this time by the appellants but flatly rejected it,
stating:
If Dennir,6 ~the applicant - developer] expended substantial sums for the preparation
of plans and documents in good faith reliance
upon law prior to [the new zoning ordinance]
and which expenditures were incurred upon
the reasonable probability of a building
permit being issued then Denning must be
allowed the right to proceed.
In order to avoid unnecessary appellate
proceedings and for the proper guidance
of the trial court, we are of the opinion
that for Denning to be allowed the right
to proceed in the constructing the
planned structure the facts must show that
Denning had been given assurances of some
form by appellants that Denning's proposed
construction met zoning requirements.
[Sic]
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And that DC>nning had a right to rely on such
assurances thereby equitably estopping
appellants from enforcing the terms [of
the new ordinance].
Id. at 330.
The Florida court addressed the issue similarly to the
Havmii court.
~ood,

In Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of

329 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1976) the Florida Supreme

Court held that the city was equitably estopped from rezoning
petitioner's property:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel
may be invoked against a municipality
as if it were an individual [citations
omitted] and the city's contention
that the doctrine is inapplicable
where actual physical construction
has not yet begun, is without merit.
[Citations omitted] . . . [T]he
doctrine of equitable estoppel will
preclude a municipality from exercising
its zoning power where . . .
[A] property owner (1) in good
faith (2) upon some act or
omission of the government (3)
has made such a substantial
change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would
be highly inequitable and unjust
to destroy the right he acquired.
329 So. 2d at 15 through 16.
Under the circumstances of that case, the court held
that the city was both equitably estopped from changing the
zoning on plaintiff's land and that the plaintiff had
a vested propertyright under a prior building permit.

The
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court further noted that "every citizen has the right to expect

that he will be dealt with fairly by his government,"

Id .. at 18, and that unfair dealing could be the basis for
equitable estoppel.
Colorado has a 1 s o

addressed the issues brought

forth by the doctrines of equitable estoppel and vested
rights.

The leading case in Colorado is Crawford v.

McLaughlin, 473 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1970).

After recognizing

the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
zoning situations, and recognizing that many jurisdictions
of the United States do not regard a property owner to have
vested rights until the owner has taken steps in reliance on
the permit, the court noted that in this case, the land-

owner's acts "which were of a significant nature, occurred
preliminarily to the issuance of the permit."

473 P. 2d at 731.

These were such acts as the purchase of the land, architectural
fees, etc.

The court further stated, "the totality of the

situation should be weighed in the equitable balance." Id.
The court also stated:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel bars
a municipal corporation from enforcing
an obligation by taking a position contrary
to a previous representation relied on by
defendants to their detriment.
!d.
There are many different legal standards applied by the
highest courts of different states throughout this country
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concerning the issue of vested rights.

Some courts place

the time of vesting after the permit has been issued and the
developer has materially and substantially relied thereon,
others at the time of the issuance of the permit.

Other

courts, such as Hawaii, while recognizing a doctrinal
difference between equitable estoppel and vested rights,
seem to adhere to the theory that a vested right is acquired
by the property owner at the time the local governmental
entity is estopped from enforcing the new zoning ordinance
against the property owner.

Still other courts, among

which Utah is included, place the time of vesting at the
time application is made by a developer to the governing
authority.

This is the principle established and set down

in Contracts Funding.
If the property owner has done everything necessary
under existing laws to apply for a permitted use, the local
governing authority cannot deny the property owner that use
by enacting zoning ordinances eliminating the use. The
rationale, as previously stated in the Contracts Funding
case, is consistent with the district court's decision to
grant plaintiffs a vested right to develop their subdivision
and to estop defendants under Morgan, supra, from denying
plaintiffs the right to develop their property as a residential
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subdivision as applied for.

Quoting from Contracts Funding:

The weakness of defendants' case is .
an ordinance, which, if sustained as to
the property subject to this litigation,
would destroy property rights and emasculate
and eliminate laws and regulations extant at
the time application for a permit was made, by retrospection, - and effective by such
ex post facto determination, as of a date
nearly a year before.
If this be permissible
there is no reason why the ordinance could
not reach back five years, a decade or earlier.
527 P.2d at 1074.
CONCLUSION
Utah law has determined that where a use is permitted
and a property owner applies for a permit to develop its
property for such a permitted use, that property owner's rights
vest at the time of proper application for needed approval.
If the property owner has satisfied the procedural requirements,
the governing authority (in this case, Logan City) cannot
deny the property owner the right to develop the property by
enacting an ordinance with the effect of prohibiting a permitted
use after the property owner has properly applied for approval.

Under Dansie and Morgan v. State Board of Lands, supra,
the principle was established that the local governing
authority is estopped to deny a property owner the right to
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pursue the development of the property owner's property
where the local governing authority made representations or
remained silent Hhen it ought to have spoken which induced
the property owner to rely and the property owner reasonably
relied on the actions or inactions of the governing authority
to his damage and detriment.
Plaintiffs, in 1969, purchased the subject property
intending to develop it for uses including the development
of single-family dwelling units for families seeking residential
housing in a moderate price range. Plaintiffs had several
conversations with the Logan City officials who encouraged
plaintiffs to develop the property in such a manner.

At no

time since the purchase of the property in 1969 until August
of 1977 were plaintiffs informed by any city official that a
subdivision consisting of single-family dwelling units would
not be allowed so long as the application and development
procedures of the Logan City Ordinances were complied with.
The plaintiffs undertook to comply and did everything necessary
to comply with those procedures.

Nevertheless, the Logan

City officials denied plaintiffs the right to develop their
property into a subdivision consisting of single-family
dwelling units.
Defendants sought to deny plaintiffs the right to
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develop their property in such a manner by enacting an
ordinance in January of 1978, well after plaintiff had
applied for and made substantial efforts to comply with
the Logan City ordinance, and well after plaintiffs had
filed this action requesting the district court to determine whether plaintiffs had a vested right to develop their
property and whether the defendants were estopped from
denying the plaintiffs' right to develop their property
in a manner which was consistent with a permitted use under
the Logan City Zoning Ordinances.
Plaintiffs-Respondents submit that this court should
affirm the judgment rendered by the district court which
held that plaintiffs have a vested right to develop
their property as a

s~t~~~ision

and that defendants were

estopped from denying plaintiffs' right to so develop
their property.
Respectfully submitted,
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